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THE DOCTRINAIRE IN TIME OF CRISIS.<sup>1</sup>

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

Everybody works but the philosopher; the philosopher rules.—*After Plato.*

**I**N THESE days of the cry for preparedness and the awe of efficiency and the heralding of the superman, in these days when to everyone the atmosphere feels charged and most radical changes are felt to be near at hand, the things of the mind and the heart cannot really be so much discredited or so wholly forgotten and dismissed as some would wish them, as many seem to imagine them and as events in certain quarters might lead us all to suppose them. There is, no doubt, a deal of practical wisdom in present fortification and armament. Scientific skill is, no doubt, a power that will really do things. No doubt, too, a new human genius, racial or personal, is near its fulfilment and delivery and, relatively to the past, superhumanly will have its material triumphs. But military preparation and scientific efficiency and a materially superior humanity must be very far from the only needs or—be it added—from the only passions of the hour. Thus there is that, as I believe, in the present events and their crisis, which may well remind us of Plato and the royal importance which he would give to philosophy; for now, as always in the past at time of great crisis, the preparation demanded is by no means only of man physical.

Material and rational efficiency indeed! Always, when under stress of events, men have felt they must be more thoroughly practical, more effectively active, they have had also to acquire attitudes which I shall call attitudes of the spirit and which many would regard attitudes of inaction. Thus men have found quite as much need of right feeling and point of view as of mere brawn or skill or material

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<sup>1</sup> President's address delivered April 21 before the Western Philosophical Association at its annual meeting in St. Louis, Mo., April 21-22, 1916.

resources; of inner life, of courage and heroic living within, as of practical action without; and the much heralded superman of to-day or to-morrow can offer no exception to what has been in the past. Triumphant superiority, in short, superiority of the sort that has made new epochs, not only never has been only physical, but also must not ever be expected to be only physical. Have men, even when striving primarily for physical superiority, ever failed at least to avow motives of culture and civilization? Even more to the point, has not great spiritual leadership always been born when physical nature has been most loose and violent? As I have ventured to render Plato, everybody works but the philosopher; the philosopher, apostle of the spirit, rules.

Of the philosopher, then, of him whom many would style, meaning anything but praise, only the doctrinaire, notoriously so innocent of anything material and practical, of the doctrinaire in time of crisis I would speak on this occasion. The signs that recent events have checked the activities of the human mind as well as brought despair to the human spirit are many. Editors, for example, and secretaries of learned societies have complained that the needed contributions or papers have failed to come and interest in reading as well as in writing is said to have waned. Only war literature, too near the time and the fact to be more than emotionally satisfying, "J 'Accuse" and "The Pentecost of Calamity" in their different ways showing very well what I mean, has really held the attention; and already this literature seems to be losing its hold. But, as to the latter point, with the emotional and more partisan literature passing, as well as with the significant decline of the hate-cults and of similar symptoms of lack of control, a more rational and impartial standpoint may surely be counted on and from such a standpoint must come permanently significant ideas, material for influential theory; and the doctrinaire may then take the place that, as already suggested here, history would award him, among the supermen of the time.

Here surely is a striking paragraph from Figgis's Introduction to his little book: "From Gerson to Grotius"; a paragraph that assigns to the doctrinaire no humble place in history:

"Hildebrand, Calvin, Rousseau were doctrinaires, if ever there were such. Yet neither Bismarck nor even Napoleon has had a more terrific strength to shape the destinies of men. In literature as in life the thinker may be dull, but it is a significant dullness."

Those are startling phrases. The "terrific strength" of the doctrinaire! How that must shock all who have found the doctrinaire innocent of the work of the world, perhaps even declaring with a certain "learned" judge that theory never did anything in the whole history of mankind. The thinker's "significant dullness!" Can this be aught but the familiar stupidity, the common dullness, of abstract truth, of non-partisan ideas? How dull such ideas have to be and—reflect on this carefully—in that they are so comprehensive and therefore so essential or vital how much closer to reality and to the irresistible power of reality than anything partisan, however interesting or exciting, can ever be! Just once more may I repeat my Platonic parody? Everybody works but the philosopher. The philosopher, however, the doctrinaire, thanks even to his so-called idleness and the seeming dullness of his abstractions, makes history; while the recognized workers among men, always so practical and efficient, only busily keep the things that already are going or—as should be conceded—at times greatly change those things *outwardly*; the philosopher, I say, makes history, consenting as he does by his attention on abstract non-partisan ideas to the free, terrifically strong, always creative life of nature. Nature, it must be remembered, or reality, is always impartial, allowing the activities of all sides; just like an abstract idea. The great Greek's doctrine, then, of the philosopher-king may never hold for any visible throne or its robed and royal occupant; certainly, in spite of the hopes of the mediæval church, it has not so held in the past;

but, as giving report of what holds invisibly, of what is true of life apart from its show of form and importance of visible institution, it simply applies to those great powers behind thrones, those unofficial rulers of human life, abstract principle and the nature that, like her storm or her sunshine, is no respecter of the just or the unjust. It is more than a pretty fancy that nature is only the invisible throne from which the thinker rules, administering his abstract principle. His rule, too, is an absolute one, even as the Greek said; absolute perhaps at the expense of manifest form and location and ordinary practicality, but still absolute; and so unlike the local and temporal authority of crowned kings with their pomp and their display, their rise and their fall.

Is it immodest that a philosopher—at least by profession and office—in such exalted language should remind a company of philosophers of their royal or imperial calling? The possible offense cannot, after all, be very great, for the authority and the throne claimed are not ordinarily public or publicly assertive. Moreover, however immodestly, there is indisputably as much justice in the present appreciation of philosophy as in the common charges against it. There can, indeed, be no public office, no visible throne for the philosopher, as most men would insist, because he simply is so impractical, irrational, fantastic. Free and speculative, not scientific; poetic and visionary, not sober; often cryptic or—a still harder word—apocalyptic, not normal and intelligible, the philosopher may not be trusted with a throne, should he seek or desire one. But, as with other men, the faults that stand thus in his way are very near to his virtues or—better put—are his possible virtues, the basis of whatever opportunity is his. So often all that a fault needs is more courage, confidence, sense of responsibility. Thus, in this case of philosophy, the courage of seeming abnormal, irrational, speculative, unintelligible, only poetic, above all impractical and impartial, is just what may bring to the philosopher his “terrific strength,”

his "significant dullness," his irresistible albeit unthroned authority.

Again, there are philosophers and philosophers, doctrinaires and doctrinaires; very much as there are physicians and physicians; quacks, on the one hand, and men of real service and achievement on the other; the difference possibly being only that, just remarked, between faults and virtues, irresponsibility and responsibility. There is the faulty, futile way of being speculative, visionary, cryptic, the way of all quackery, and there is the excellent way of genuine achievement. The philosopher-king may take his court-fool from the quacks, if he choose, but he himself must be of very different mind and work. In philosophy, as in medicine, the quack has never really earned, or made intimately his own, such equipment of idea and technique as he has and also that which he has he puts to no genuine and appropriate use, his expression of his calling being only parodic; but the true man, philosopher or physician, has what he has by real attainment and makes genuine and vital use of it. Take, for specific example, the unscientific character of the philosopher. In this lies real danger as well as real opportunity; in it are possible folly and futility as well as possible high achievement. True philosophy, responsible to its great calling, must be more than science, say superscientific; it must in fact be unscientific, but unscientific, not by any means in the sense of ignorance or contempt, but in the sense of free and appreciative use, through the very revelations of science seeing beyond what science itself with the very best instruments and methods sees or ever can see. The *mediation* of science, in other words, not science's immediate form and content or method and vision, is true philosophy as well as—in a real sense—unscientific philosophy. Thus science is for philosophy, not philosophy for science.

More generally, too, that is, in other fields of human experience besides that of accurate, positive, scientific knowledge and method, the philosopher, if concerning himself with these fields and also showing himself true to

his calling, must have an appreciative familiarity with the normal and practical life that surrounds him. He must have the skill and freedom of this life and its ways; mediation here, as above, being indispensable. In life, as in thought or knowledge, true philosophy requires the real use of something formal and normal in service of something vital. So Socrates used Sophistry. So Luther used Romanism. So at large the speculative life, if justified, uses life's formal media of expression; being thus a great spender or investor; putting to real use, without the miserly restraint of the always conservative "practical" man, the known facts and accustomed ways of the time. The speculative philosopher really uses, while the practical man spends only for return in kind. Loyal to what is natural and vital, philosophy may neither cultivate the normal, the formal and visible, just for its own sake nor ignore this; but always must find in it the medium of what is natural, the instrument of what is vital. In fine, speculative thinking after—in the sense also of thorough—scientific knowledge, poetry after positive experience, adventure that is able to employ, as it sets out, the best equipment of its day, an idealism that has its roots in realism and pragmatism, these show the philosopher's or the doctinaire's true path and they show also in a new way the source of his "terrific strength"; for they show, not only his attention upon general principles and his consent to that executive of general principle, the free life of nature, both of these marking a resort to what is vital, but they show also what is formal come into the free use of what is vital. Can there be a greater strength in action or in thought than that of the vital *using* the formal? Not scientificism, then, nor even mathematicalism, not formalism of any kind nor any rigid logic and its consistencies can ever be philosophy; yet important services to philosophy must belong to all of them.

And of philosophy one thing more must be said; and, in view of the present call for the philosopher, or doctinaire, a very timely thing. Thus, when men turn to abstract

and non-partisan truth, to general principles, always they are in the midst of some conflict, even as at the present time. Their own way of living and thinking has come into conflict with some other way and the resort to abstract principle has for its motive, not only what I have called mediation, the mediation of their way but also adjustment and reconciliation of the conflicting ways. It is thus the peculiar opportunity of general principle to marshal to its service *all* the forces, however different, of the life of its time. What wonder that philosophy is so powerful.

Now, as doctrinaires, Hildebrand, Calvin, Rousseau, "terrifically strong," "significantly dull," had that power at once of the vital using the formal and of abstract principle marshalling different forces; but, if I may add just one to Figgis's list, Plato himself, so conscious of the power of philosophy, has had few if any superiors and, although the story may seem too old to be told again, especially here, I would use the reign of Plato to illustrate the three things which I have so far said about the power of philosophy. Thus, in simple summary of what has been said: (1) Philosophy rules by its very abstraction, its aloofness from partisanship, and by its consequent consent—volitional as well as intellectual—to informal and impartial or all-sided nature; (2) The virtue or the strength of philosophy lies potentially in its very dangers or faults; and (3) There can be no might like that which comes to philosophy from its finding in the formal the mediation of the vital or—the same thing—from its resigning all the forms, that men have set up and have long cherished as of immediate worth, to the full free use of impartial nature.

The philosophy of Plato centres about the Idea or the World of Ideas. At least for the purposes of this address the Platonic Idea may be called an intellectual or conceptual extension, made to cover all things in experience, that is, the things in natural life as well as the things in social and political life, of the cosmopolitan spirit, the sense of universality, then developed or developing in Greece and



especially in Athens. It was this, as well as a deeply logical outcome or climax of the science and philosophy of the past. And also, to recall Zeller's account, in which he says that with Plato's Ideas the definitions or conceptions of Socrates became metaphysical realities or entities, it was real and substantial but in a world of its own, a world of things-in-general, an invisible and immaterial world. The Idea, then, meant, first, a generalization from the particular, the local and temporal life of Greek experience, and, second, a sublimation of it and even a certain withdrawal from, or negation of, that life. With regard to these meanings, however, one must not forget, as many seem to have forgotten, that neither the generalization nor the negation, expressed by the Idea, was or ever could be free from the positive historical context in which it had arisen and that the necessary effect of the bondage to that context was to put context and Idea in the relation—always a dynamic relation—of means and end. Too many students of theories and their history are quite oblivious of the fact that the general and the negative must always, however general and negative, carry the context of something particular and positive. Remembering, then, the notion of the Idea as only an extension of the cosmopolitan spirit of its time, we can see in it a virtual gifting of all the results of Greek life to human life at large. Greek life was put to the use of life at large and Plato's philosophy, only carrying forward that of his master Socrates, by its Idealism, by an Other-worldism that asserted neither more nor less than an other world of the universals which were intimated in the particulars of the Greek world, only served to complete, by valuing ideally, the then happening *mediation* of Greek civilization in Mediterranean history. What but eventual mediation could be the import of the relativism, the conventionality and the utilitarian spirit—vices that were only so many possible virtues—to which Greek life was declining even in the time of Pericles and had well nigh openly committed itself in the time of Socrates and Plato? Henceforth the Greek expression of

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life could be only an abstract and prosaic symbol for consciousness, a symbol of something universal, and a lifeless instrument for activity, an instrument of world-wide changes. Of course any instrument of life must itself be lifeless; any mere symbol must be prosaic. In time, too, the Greek mode or régime, becoming a mere utility for exploitation by alien powers, the play of unsympathetic natural forces and primitive passions, as its armies were hired, its institutions rudely imitated, its adorned cities plundered, its intellectual life exploited, its morality debauched, its very religion appropriated and degraded, the Greek régime became still more truly mere mediating symbol and instrument. So, if Plato's Idealism was a recognition and valuation of what I have already called the mediation of Greek civilization, it was also, at least prophetically, a sanction and appreciation even of the final passing of that civilization, say an idealistic meditation on death, as the local, provincial life surrendered itself to the larger whole. Do not civilizations die that what they have achieved may get into free use? But, to revert to what I would especially stress, the Platonic Idea held in it as essential to its meaning, that is, to its dynamic value or power, the mediation of Greek life, the Mediterranean use of Greek achievements.

As giving additional support to this view of Plato's Idea, there is the important fact that the personal individual, instead of the class or nation, had become or was becoming the vital unit of Greek life. Of the assertive individual two things, now quite familiar to us, are quite true: (1) For him the formal or institutional life is means, not end; and (2) His loyalty is primarily to abstract principle, to spirit rather than to letter, while his world is wide and free, the world of the cosmopolitan, and his life, often boastfully, the life of nature. Moreover, not only was the time of Plato or, more broadly, of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, a time of cosmopolitan individuals *using* the formal, conventional life of their time and place under no restraint save that of loyalty to abstract principle, a

loyalty that always makes for great freedom, when not for great license; but also it was a time when the Platonic Idea and its peculiar *motif*, evident in both the use and the loyalty, were widely propagated and popularized by all sorts of isms, notably at first by Cynicism and Cyrenaicism and later, after Aristotle, by Stoicism and Epicurism. In their various ways these isms led men to accept as worth while and so to will even as ideal the life of nature, thus making them cultivate an inner life and the significant subjective attitudes of an inner life and at the same time accept even as theirs, come good or ill, the uncontrolled, seemingly lawless, irrational life of the world outside. So was the Stoic able to say, as death came by some violence of nature: "Such was my will"; and the Epicurean: "So long as I am, death is not." Through these isms, then, that left human devices the sport of nature and made human creatures very subjective and inwardly personal, the Platonic Idea came to rule the Mediterranean; not, of course, from any visible throne but in the life and consciousness of living, willing, human individuals. Not to appreciate thus the evident dynamic value and historic achievement of the Idea is to find Plato, the doctinaire, only dull; dull without being significant.

Perhaps I have failed to make what I would say clear. Yet this is my notion. In Plato's doctrine, judged not abstractly by itself but actually by its historic context, there is manifest preparation of the human spirit for historic action, nay, for historic volition, for epoch-making and world-wide movement and in a significant and inspiring degree, inspiring to all thinkers, the agency of that action belongs to Plato himself, doctinaire that he was. Men sometimes act through ingeniously devised tools or machinery; sometimes through the social order supplied by customs and institutions; and, when they so act, we do not deny them the agent's part in what is done. How subtle and skilful they are! What a practical and productive life they lead! How well they must have planned! How intelligent they must be! But let men deepen their in-

sight, let them in their vision of the Idea insist that a free nature, unconfined in any tool or institution, be the medium through which their will works and that all human devices, all tools and institutions, be put to nature's service; and we abuse them as mere doctrinaires, impractical, unproductive, idle. Surely to will the life of nature, surrendering things human to that, is a greater thing than to wield a tool, however effectively, or to head an institution, however successfully. A great difference there is, of course, between nature's life, as in the naïveté of childhood and savagery, and *willing* nature's life. I suggest, further, that the "activity within" of a doctrinaire, like Plato, is more tremendous in what it produces without than that of any user of tools or of any head of an institution, and as to the part that tools and institutions have in that inner activity, in the volition of it, or in the life of nature, which is its outer expression, these always, although in a sense subordinated, have the value of memories or of passing habits of thought and action which supply the new life with bases of guidance and valuation. Thus even out of the new life and its new conditions old things must be renewed or remade; on new lines, perhaps, in forms more comprehensive and adaptive, but still the old, old things. So did Rome, as I remember Sir John Seeley to have put it, become only a new, albeit a very much overgrown, Greek city-state. But, to return to Plato, it is well as to his life and achievement to remember that he failed, when making his three expeditions to Sicily, in his effort to establish there an ideal Greek commonwealth; he was such a dreamer; his vision was so abstract. Yet, when I think of Plato and his Idea, dynamic at once with the passing forms and memories of a great civilization and with the untethered life of the whole Mediterranean, I forget Sicily and recall impartial and imperial Rome and catholic St. Peter's. In the making of Rome Plato had a greater rôle than either Alexander, the forerunner in the building of a Mediterranean empire, or Julius Caesar himself. Plato's vision really was so abstract!

I set out by declaring that there was to-day a call for the doctinaire, for the man of far vision, the vision of abstract principle, and following that declaration, besides discussing the rule of philosophy and then illustrating this by the regal position of Plato in history, I pointed out that the speculative thinker had his duty to science or, more generally, to form and discipline. Would I, then, look to the training of colleges and universities to supply the doctinaire or the doctinaires for which the times are calling? I can merely reply that these institutions will have failed to justify themselves and the public's support of them, if they fail to graduate some great seers, able by their superior training to see well and far, even quite beyond what is positively visible, to see, let me say, around the curve in the road. With this metaphor, too, it is well to recall that the world now rides in an automobile. Far and alert seers the life of to-day must have and, providing them, our institutions of learning will have done only their natural service.

Not long ago the "practical" men of society were given to finding fault with the universities for sending out doctinaires and inefficients generally. Their fault-finding had some warrant, I do not doubt, although to any "practical" man any real thinker may seem inefficient. Sensitive to the criticism, however, the universities adopted reforms. Witness the passing of the classics, the rise of the natural sciences, such changes in the curriculum as are best summed up in the words, commercialism and vocationalism; the neglect of the humanities in general, not merely of the classics; the uneven struggle for maintenance of scholarship and pure science; the dangers from too much technical requirement threatening independence and originality; the restraint, too often reported, on freedom of thought and teaching; departmental individualism; the narrowness of the training in many if not in most of the professional schools, be they schools of medicine, engineering, dentistry, law, or theology; and, to stop here, the still practiced idolatry of specialism. That all these have

been checks on the graduation of great doctrinaires no one can fail to appreciate. The restraint of them, it is quite true, may have had, or indeed must have had, its real use, supplying the advantage of continued, careful looking, as well as that of long, formal discipline, before the adventure of a new leap. But, this granted, a crisis is here; a change must now come.

In time of crisis man must leap. Breadth and depth of view as well as freedom of view must be wholly possible. In all subjects, departments, professions, these must not only be possible; also they must be openly encouraged. As never before, free scholarship, pure science, bold speculation must be fostered; for only of the spirit of these things is the great doctrinaire born. The way to a regal vision may be through discipline, but it leads beyond discipline. The colleges and universities, then, must take care lest in their zeal to serve life practically they fail in the present need to serve it really, failing to provide it with real seers. Without real vision, especially in time of crisis, life cannot live.

And suppose the universities should not respond to the present call. History has many examples of institutions being found wanting in critical moments, the work required being taken up by agencies quite outside the institutional walls. Frequently, for example, the church has been put to shame in this way, but I am not one of those who think the church the only institution that has faults. Our universities may fail in their duty. Yet the goal is greatly worth their striving and, in any event, what life must have it usually gets; if not in one way, then in some other. For the great change that seems to be drawing near, men of commanding vision must come and surely will come.

From all that I have said so far there is at least one very obvious conclusion. Our profession never has had larger possibilities. It has never been more worth while or in face of greater responsibilities. The philosopher, the thinker, above all the young thinker of to-day is challenged, as

never before. To speak very directly, the current issue of preparedness cannot be met by mere military organization, by armies and munitions alone. What Plato knew as the Idea must be rediscovered for our time and, dynamic with all the elements of civilization which the different nations are representing, given to the consciousness and volition of the world. Your interest, as shown by the chief topic of discussion at this meeting of the Association, certainly indicates that you are responding to the present demand and the papers presented, some of them already read and discussed, show how fully you realize that the problem is not a narrowly political one but a problem demanding the widest and freest study; a problem, if I may so express myself, that must be brought by thinkers, trained to skill and widely informed, to the court of the Idea. To-day's vision must measure fully to the issue.

Should the great issue of the day be met only in the ways of material efficiency, no really new life could come out of the conflict and certainly human life, so tried, so deeply searched, has a right to something new. Moreover, where there is real conflict, as at present, there is always more than just a balancing of like forces that represent life on a certain plane, of a certain kind; there is also an issue drawn between that kind of life and something different in kind, something new. In really significant struggles, I say, like forces are set against each other, but also kinds of life, one lower, the other higher, one passing, the other coming, are at war. I have no direct quarrel, then, with the promoters of military preparedness or of preparedness in any merely material way, but I must protest against their assumption, apparent if not real, that their sort of preparedness is the only sort or that the struggle has only the one aspect of a meeting of military forces, very real and present for the actual contestants, very real and future for peoples that are now neutral. They should remember that before war one cannot prepare, during war one cannot fight and, above all, after war one cannot live by soldiers or munitions alone. Also they should re-

member, even while they plan for the battle of like forces, the other battle between kinds of living and, remembering this, they should have some patience with those who hear besides the call to arms a call to ideas. Ideas may lack the notes of martial music and the odors of deadly explosives, but not to heed the call to ideas is at once treachery to the past and cowardice toward the future. Not to face the possibility of a new kind of life is to refuse to face honestly a real phase of the great struggle. It is such a mistake to suppose that there is no fighting in thinking and no courage required of the thinker.

Much is heard of neutrality, especially on this side of the Atlantic. But neutrality is of two sorts. There is the neutrality which only the policy of the moment prompts and which may be disturbed at any moment. I would call this a military neutrality, because war is the air it breathes. The neutral nation is always thinking of itself as either in the war or not in it. Other nations are no better than possible enemies. Present and future are judged under no values save those incident to war. The future holds nothing different, except as to personnel and magnitude, from what has been in the past. But, besides this military neutrality, there is another, springing not from momentary policy, but from deep and critically informed conviction, the neutrality of impartial thought, the neutrality that is superior to the war of forces, because it can see right and wrong on both sides, and that looks to an outcome that will bring new life through assimilation of the warring factors to each other and that will accordingly give victory as well as defeat to both. When, as not long ago, an Englishman said to me that in spite of his patriotism, which often blinded him to many things, he had to recognize the best solution of the present war to be rather a drawn war than the serious defeat of either side, he was at least for the moment neutral in this way of the impartial thinker. He had got at least a distant view of the Idea. Handicapped as he was by having his own country on one side of the battle of forces, he was nevertheless feeling some responsibility to the battle of kinds of living and to



the impartial thinking which by sanctioning the warring forces and calling for their adaptation will make possible something new in the life of nations. Of course all new life must come from adjustments of different ways of life and there is no power like that which comes to life from the assimilation to each other of ways and forces that have met in conflict.

I touch now upon a delicate matter. Have we always been as sympathetic as we should be with the tribe of the Pacifists, perhaps at this time the most unpopular group in this neutral nation of ours? The Pacifists are flagrantly guilty, it is commonly said or felt, of abstraction and sentiment; dreaming, as they seem to, of a most visionary future, they blind themselves to present facts, to political requirements, to fundamental biological necessities; and so they are impractical even to the point of doing more harm than good. Blind they are without doubt. Yet have they absolutely no right to consideration? Is ridicule or abuse their only due? Are they after all so thoroughly impractical as to be interested in something that has no place in human life and interest? Surely, when one really thinks broadly and candidly, their abstraction and sentiment—or unreason—are only counter to and compensative of the equally unreasoning abstraction under which their detractors think about war; and, if the question be one simply of sentiment, unreason and impracticality, I submit that the honors are about even. Often ill-advised, extravagant, fantastic, the peace propaganda nevertheless has its real place in present life and thought, say also in the present cult of preparedness. The many movements and societies having part in it I need not name here, but in large measure they, too, are making ready for conditions and possibilities at the close of the war and, taken all in all, are not meaning to interfere with the warring nations in their conduct of the war or with neutral nations in a reasonable and practical foresight. Simply, at least as I understand them, claiming, too, no great insight or originality for my interpretation of them, in their propaganda they hope that the public consciousness may be

so educated now—observe the note of preparedness—that, later, when the present war comes to an end, a positive influence may be ready and actively exerted, on the powers that shall then be, against the policy, as a recognized policy, as the trump card, of the settlement of disputes by resort to arms and that accordingly a change may be brought about which will really give to life a new quality, putting it openly and squarely on a new basis, bringing it some new life in return for the present agony. I am not one who even for a moment can allow himself to think the time is coming when there will be no more wars, but I am one who believes in abatement and betterment and especially in a progress to higher planes and methods for the rivalries of men and peoples.

Yes, as to the peace societies, however loose and inexperienced in their ideas, however suggestive of mere Utopian dreaming these may appear to be, they still do show that the people are planning and hoping as well as planning and fearing; struggling for some vision as well as reaching for sword and shield. In a neutral country, moreover, only to plan and fear, deliberately to discourage planning and hoping, is—recalling phrases used already—treachery to the past and cowardice towards the future. The Pacifists, even the worst of them, you see, are not the only cowards! Paradoxically, of course, yet with real point, a time of war being always a time of paradoxes, thinking and planning that is merely what men commonly call practical is not practical, because it is bound to be short-sighted, historically conservative, unproductive. A neutral people, furthermore, that would maintain its self-respect in a time of great world-struggle, sooner or later must either—notice the alternation—pluckily abandon its neutrality, so easily cultivated for most selfish and sordid motives, and openly and vigorously enter the struggle, which openly or not it cannot help taking a real part in, or, assuming that greater neutrality, to which I have referred, must apply its best thinking, its best planning, its fullest power and purpose to the possibility that the struggle itself has created of a new and better way of interna-

tional living. Remember the struggle has those two aspects: (1) A meeting and balancing of forces in kind, the kind showing life on one plane, and (2) A meeting of two kinds of life, one mainly traditional, the other in prospect, striving for realization. The neutral nation, I say, that would prove its worth and courage, cannot stay out; but must choose, facing all the chances of failure, not merely with which side, but also with which phase of the conflict it will identify itself. If neutral as to the first with good cause and honest purpose, it cannot be neutral as to the second. Staying out of the war with dignity, it must fight for the best results of the war, seeking to make its influence and effective participation in the results proportionate with its greatness and importance, to make the results true to its best genius and vision. Here, you see, I am making an appeal to the courage not less than to the conscience of the neutral nation. The greater the nation, the greater the opportunity and the more pointed the appeal.

But I shall seem to have digressed. The appeal on this occasion is directly to the thinking of the people. Are the peace-propagandists sentimental, visionary, inexpert in their thinking? Are the advocates of preparedness sentimental, visionary, inexpert in their thinking? Are both the peace party and the war party impractical and one-sided? Then it remains for me to say, concluding this address before the teachers of philosophy from a large and important section of a still too neutral people, that the challenge to the expert thinker, broad in view and skilful in method and clean-cut in statement, at the present time is only so much the more insistent. The thinkers of Germany and Austria, of France and England and Russia, cannot have the opportunity which plainly lies before the thinkers of a great nation, not openly in the struggle, like the United States. Once again in history philosophy has the chance of a great reign.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.